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ARE PEOPLE IN FEDERAL TERRITORIES
PART OF “WE THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES”?
by: Gary Lawson* & Guy Seidman**
ABSTRACT
In 1820, a unanimous Supreme Court proclaimed: “The United States is the
name given to our great republic, which is composed of states and territories.”
While that key point is simple, and perhaps even obvious, the constitutional
implications of interpreting “the United States” to include federal territories
are potentially far reaching. In particular, the Constitution’s Preamble announces that the Constitution is authored by “We the People of the United
States” and that the document is designed to “secure the Blessings of Liberty”
to the author and its “Posterity.” If inhabitants of federal territory are among
“We the People of the United States,” then federal actors owe them (and their
“Posterity”) the same fiduciary duties owed to people in the States. There is no
definitive answer regarding the original meaning of “We the People of the
United States,” but the presumptive meaning of “the United States” in 1788
included federal territory, so the presumptive meaning of “the People of the
United States” would similarly include people in federal territory. While there
are strong textual and contextual arguments for excluding territorial inhabitants from “We the People,” there are also countervailing textual and contextual arguments for their inclusion. In the end, the answer may depend on
something beyond the reach of interpretative theory: How strong is the presumption in favor of inclusion that can be drawn from pre-1788 understandings and practices? If territorial inhabitants are indeed among “We the People
of the United States,” then federal action toward the territories must conform
to fiduciary norms, including the key norm of impartiality with respect to multiple beneficiaries, which would require very strong reasons for disfavoring
territorial inhabitants in comparison to state inhabitants.
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INTRODUCTION
In Loughborough v. Blake,1 decided in 1820, a unanimous Supreme
Court proclaimed: “[T]he United States . . . is the name given to our
great republic, which is composed of States and territories. The district
https://DOI.org/10.37419/LR.V9.I3.3
* William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University School
of Law.
** Professor, The Harry Radzyner School of Law, The Interdisciplinary Center
(IDC), Herzliya, Israel.
1. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820).
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of Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri [River], is not less
within the United States, than Maryland or Pennsylvania.”2 At the
time of this statement, the Court could not realistically look beyond
the continental United States or even beyond the Rocky Mountains;
the “territory west of the Missouri” ended with the boundaries of the
Louisiana Purchase.3 Turning southward, the United States was well
on its way to acquiring Florida from Spain,4 but in 1820, that was the
extent of the nation’s expansion from the original boundaries confirmed by the Treaty of Paris in 1783.5 The United States had not yet
become an overseas empire with island possessions in two oceans.
On its face, however, the Supreme Court’s unqualified statement in
Loughborough would seem to apply equally to federally acquired territory southeast of the Caloosahatchee River, such as Puerto Rico or
the Virgin Islands, or far southwest of the Colorado River, such as
American Samoa. The Constitution speaks only of “Territory . . . belonging to the United States,”6 without distinctions based on geography, culture, or time. If the Supreme Court’s broad language was right
in 1820, the term “the United States” includes not only States but also
federally controlled territories, whatever their location.
While that key point is simple, and perhaps even obvious, the constitutional implications of such an interpretation of “the United
States” are potentially far reaching. Just to name a few implications: If
“the United States” to which the Supreme Court was referring in 1820
was the same “United States” that appears as a term 53 times in the
Constitution of 1788 (and again in the Fourteenth Amendment of
1868), all federal duties, imposts, and excises would need to be uniform across both States and territories7—meaning that there could
2. Id. at 318–19. The Court anticipated these remarks 15 years earlier. While
holding that residents of the District of Columbia were not, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, state citizens for diversity purposes, the Court thought it clear that
D.C. residents were “citizens of the United States.” Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 445, 453 (1805). The same would presumably be true of residents of other
federal territory at the time.
3. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic,
Fr.-U.S., Apr. 30, 1803, art. I, 8 Stat. 200, 202. The precise extent of the Louisiana
Purchase was not entirely clear in 1803. See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 87–89 (2004). At a minimum, it included all or part of the present States of
Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
4. See Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits, Spain-U.S., Feb. 22, 1819, art. II, 8
Stat. 252. Spain did not ratify the treaty until October 5, 1820, and the treaty was not
effectuated until early 1821. See WILLIAM EARL WEEKS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND
AMERICAN GLOBAL EMPIRE 169 (1992). But as a practical matter at least parts of
Florida had been part of the United States even before the treaty formalized the
acquisition. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 3, at 89–90.
5. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Gr. Brit-U.S., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
6. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
7. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States . . . .”).
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never be an export tax on territorial goods because there can be no
export taxes on state goods8 and that the only permissible “uniform”
rate on national exports would be, therefore, zero. More fundamentally, persons born in territories would appear to be United States citizens, entitled to all the rights and subject to all of the duties thereof, at
least as of 1868 by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment9 if not by
virtue of the Constitution of 1788 itself. And most importantly, if “the
United States” includes territories as well as States, then people in
territories would be among the “People of the United States” who
ordained and established the Constitution.10 Arguably, then, subsequent territorial inhabitants would be among the “Posterity”11 of the
Constitution’s author and would thus be among those for whom the
“Blessings of Liberty” are to be secured.
Present-day doctrine reflects none of these understandings. Eighty
years after Loughborough, a divided Supreme Court held that duties
on exports from Puerto Rico were constitutionally permissible,12
meaning that Puerto Rico is not considered part of “the United
States” for purposes of the uniformity provision of the Taxing Clause.
Citizenship for territorial inhabitants has long been handled by treaty
and statute rather than constitutional command, though the question
whether territorially born inhabitants are automatically citizens under
the Fourteenth Amendment is currently being litigated—the issue was
resolved in favor of constitutionally based citizenship by one district
court only to have that decision overturned by a divided vote in the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.13 For more than a century, the extension to territorial inhabitants of certain basic rights of citizens, such as
rights to trial by jury and indictment by grand jury, has been held to
be a matter of congressional choice rather than constitutional requirement for at least some territorial inhabitants.14 With respect to fiduci8. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from
any State.”).
9. See id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .”).
10. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”).
11. Id. (“[I]n Order to . . . secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity . . . .”).
12. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 249 (1901).
13. Fitisemanu v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1197 (D. Utah 2019), rev’d,
1 F.4th 862 (10th Cir. 2021).
14. See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217–18 (1903) (holding that there is no
right to indictment by grand jury or trial by petit jury in Hawaii); Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (holding that there is no right to jury trial in the
Philippines); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (holding that there is no
right to indictment by grand jury in the Philippines); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S.
298, 309 (1922) (holding that there is no right to jury trial in Puerto Rico). If the
territory is deemed “incorporated” into the United States—meaning roughly that the
territory is a serious candidate for statehood, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757
(2008)—then all rights-bearing provisions of the Constitution apply to it without re-
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ary duties, there is presently no general recognition of those duties for
federal actors, in or out of the territories, though we have written extensively on why that omission seriously misreads the Constitution,
which imposes fiduciary duties on all actors empowered by it.15 But
even if one accepts our conclusion that federal officials are fiduciaries,
the idea that territorial inhabitants are part of “the People of the
United States,” to whom those fiduciary duties run, flies in the face of
virtually all of U.S. history.
This Article focuses on a portion of the last—and we think most
basic—of the foregoing potential implications from treating territories
as part of “the United States” for purposes of the Constitution. We
explore whether, as a matter of original constitutional meaning, territorial inhabitants are part of “We the People of the United States” as
that term is used in the Preamble.
This is not an easy interpretative question to resolve—or even to
analyze. It is well known that the concept of United States citizenship
was not sharply defined at the time of the founding.16 The Constitution did not contain even a partial definition of national citizenship
until 1868, and the only specific references to the concept in the original Constitution are a grant of power to Congress to “establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization”17 as well as cryptic provisos that the
President must be “a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution,”18 that members of the House of Representatives be “seven Years a Citizen of the
gard to congressional action. See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 520–22
(1905). For unincorporated territories, only “fundamental” rights apply of their own
force. Those “fundamental” rights, under current doctrine, do not include all the provisions of the Bill of Rights regarding criminal procedure or all of the Constitution’s
structural or separation of powers provisions. For a brief (but we think telling) critique of this distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories, see
LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 3, at 196–97. For a slightly longer (and we think
equally telling) critique, see Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality
of Decolonization by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered,
50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1176–78 (2009).
15. See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017) [hereinafter POWER OF ATTORNEY]; Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Authors’ Response: An Enquiry Concerning
Constitutional Understanding, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491 (2019) [hereinafter Authors’ Response]; Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, By Any Other Name: Rational
Basis Inquiry and the Federal Government’s Fiduciary Duty of Care, 69 FLA. L. REV.
1385 (2017); Gary Lawson, Guy I. Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary
Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415 (2014). Our position is
not idiosyncratic. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib & Andrew Kent, Fiduciary Law and the Law
of Public Office, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1297 (2021); Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Implications for Self-Pardons and NonDelegation, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 463 (2019).
16. See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP,
1608-1870, at 10, 209 (1978); Michael D. Ramsey, Originalism and Birthright Citizenship, 109 GEO. L.J. 405, 410–11 (2020).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
18. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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United States,”19 and that senators be “nine Years a Citizen of the
United States.”20 It is not obvious what was meant by “a Citizen of the
United States” in these clauses. Even three quarters of a century after
the Constitution was ratified, Attorney General Edward Bates, in refusing to extend the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Dred Scott21
that even free Blacks could not be citizens of a State for purposes of
federal diversity jurisdiction, could write:
Who is a citizen? What constitutes a citizen of the United States? I
have often been pained by the fruitless search in our law books and
the records of our courts, for a clear and satisfactory definition of
the phrase citizen of the United States. I find no such definition, no
authoritative establishment of the meaning of the phrase, neither by
a course of judicial decisions in our courts, nor by the continued and
consentaneous action of the different branches of our political government. For aught I see to the contrary, the subject is now as little
understood in its details and elements, and the question as open to
argument and to speculative criticism, as it was at the beginning of
the Government.22

The arguably broader concept of “We the People of the United
States” was even more shadowy.
In prior work, we deliberately avoided trying to ascertain the identity of “We the People of the United States” who “ordained and established” the Constitution:
Who composed the entity “We the People” (never mind its posterity) in 1788? Was it just the people who actually ratified the document? Who actually participated in the ratification process? Who
were eligible to participate in the ratification process? Who chose to
honor the ratification process by failing to engage in armed rebellion? Who were subject to the jurisdiction of the institutions created
by the document whether or not he or she had any role in the document’s ratification? . . . Even to begin to sort through these complexities involving eighteenth-century understandings of citizenship,
allegiance, obligation, and claims of right would require at least a
book . . . .23

To give away the ending of this Article: We are no more confident
now than we were five years ago that we have definitive answers to
these questions. But if we are right that the Constitution is best understood as some form of fiduciary instrument, designed by and for the
19. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
20. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
21. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
22. Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 383 (1862) [hereinafter Attorney General
Opinion].
23. See POWER OF ATTORNEY, supra note 15, at 145–46; see also Seth Davis, The
False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1162 (2014)
(posing similar questions about the character of federal fiduciary obligations).
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benefit of “We the People of the United States,” those questions are
key to understanding some crucial features of the Constitution, including the status of the territories and territorial inhabitants and the
responsibilities of federal actors toward them. Thus, we are at least
going to give those questions a look.
Part I frames the issue of authorship of the Constitution, which is
crucial to understanding the role of territorial inhabitants in the constitutional scheme. Authorship matters because the Preamble declares
that the Constitution is designed to benefit “ourselves [meaning ‘We
the People of the United States’] and our Posterity.”24 Whoever
counts among “We the People of the United States” thus determines
who the Constitution regards as its beneficiaries. The Constitution’s
legal author was “We the People of the United States,” regardless of
who literally wrote or ratified the words contained in that document.
Thus, one cannot ascertain whether territorial inhabitants are part of
“We the People” simply by noting that they had no role in the ratification process and no constitutional representation in Congress. The
content of “We the People of the United States” could be co-extensive
with the “the ratifiers of the Constitution” or any other sub-group of
the continental population in 1788, but nothing in the Constitution
mandates that conclusion.
Part II discusses the status of federal territory and its inhabitants
before ratification of the Constitution in 1788 to help ascertain the
original meaning of the term “We the People of the United States” at
that time. The key proposition is that the presumptive meaning of
“the United States” in 1788 was precisely the meaning attributed to
that phrase by Chief Justice John Marshall in Loughborough. And if
“the United States” presumptively includes federal territory, “the
People of the United States” presumptively includes people in federal
territory.
In light of that pre-constitutional territorial status, Part III examines
the strongest arguments for and against considering territorial inhabitants to be part of “We the People of the United States” at the time of
the founding. Suffice it to say that there are good arguments for both
positions. The answer may depend on something beyond the capacity
of interpretative theory to determine: Who bears the burden of proof
regarding the inclusion of territorial inhabitants in “We the People of
the United States,” and how strong is that burden?
Part IV briefly sketches some of the consequences of considering
territorial inhabitants to be part of the “We the People,” on the assumption (which we defend at great length elsewhere) that the Constitution takes the form of some kind of fiduciary instrument. A full
treatment of those consequences is the stuff of a separate article or
book, but we think it can be established that the basic fiduciary duties
24. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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of federal actors extend to people in the territories as well as people in
the States.
This Article is an exploration of original meaning, which requires at
least three up-front clarifications about the nature of the project. First,
we are focused only on defining “We the People of the United States”
as of 1788 when the Constitution first took effect. There have been
other periods when the meaning of “We the People” took center stage
in U.S. legal and political history. The meaning of “We the People”
was the key issue on the eve of the Civil War in Dred Scott, in which
the plurality opinion maintained that no American Blacks—even free
Blacks with full state citizenship—could ever be citizens of any State
in the United States for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. Half
a century later, as we have also already noted, the Court, in the face of
national expansion across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, abandoned
the dictum of Loughborough v. Blake regarding the inclusive character of “the United States”; the meaning of “the United States” and its
“People” was the dominant constitutional question of that moment.
This Article addresses neither of those episodes (though we have
briefly addressed them elsewhere25) but concentrates solely on ascertaining the original meaning of “We the People of the United States”
in the Preamble to the Constitution of 1788.
Second, we emphasize that our understanding of “original meaning” is different, and in important respects narrower, than is commonplace in inquiries that generally proceed under the label “originalism.”
We mean only to ascertain the original communicative content of the
Constitution. We do not mean to prescribe that content as the basis
for judicial or other decisions. Indeed, we do not argue here (or elsewhere) that the Constitution’s communicative meaning should (or
should not) contribute in any fashion to the content of constitutional
decision-making.26 Those are important prescriptions and arguments,
25. On Dred Scott, see STEVEN GOW CALABRESI & GARY LAWSON, TEACHER’S
MANUAL TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: CREATION, RECONSTRUCTION, THE PROGRESSIVES, AND THE MODERN ERA 188 (2020). On the debates at the turn of the nineteenth century, culminating in the Insular Tariff Cases, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN,
supra note 3, at 194–97. For trenchant analyses of competing conceptions of “the
United States” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Christina
Duffy Burnett, “They Say I Am Not an American . . .”: The Noncitizen National and
the Law of American Empire, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 659 (2008); Christina Duffy Burnett,
The Constitution and Deconstitution of the United States, in THE LOUISIANA
PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION, 1803–1898 181 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew H. Sparrow eds., 2005).
26. We thus disagree with Larry Solum that contribution to legal meaning—what
Professor Solum calls the “constraint principle”—is one of the “core ideas of originalist constitutional theory.” Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2015) (“[T]he original
meaning of the constitutional text should constrain constitutional practice.”). To be
sure, Professor Solum’s claim about the core ideas of originalism is generally descriptively accurate across the broad range of originalist theory, most of which is prescriptive as well as descriptive, but it does not describe our concededly idiosyncratic
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to be sure, and others are free to offer, defend, or critique them, but
we do not offer, defend, or critique them here. Our project is purely
descriptive.
Third, with respect to that descriptive focus: By “original communicative content of the Constitution,” we mean the things and relations
in the world to which the concepts in the Constitution refer. The criteria for inclusion of things and relations in those concepts are determined by the hypothetical conceptual framework of a hypothetical
author of the document in 1788 (hence the “originalist” part of this
project) rather than by the real-world thoughts or frameworks of concrete historical individuals, whether past or present.27 In practice, this
search for hypothetical authorial intention in the context of an externally directed legal document, such as the Constitution, requires reference to the conceptual framework of a hypothetical reasonable
reader. Accordingly, we are less interested than some other theorists
might be in what actual historical figures thought or said about the
Constitution. Those real-world thoughts and words are potentially relevant for ascertaining the meaning ascribed to the Constitution by a
hypothetical actor, but they are not determinative or constitutive of
that meaning. We will not here get into the weeds of this methodology.28 We say as much as we have only because our approach differs
enough from what generally goes by the name of “originalism” so that
our use of the term “originalism” without explanation might lead to
misunderstanding. Indeed, it is not clear that the term “originalism” is
even the best description of our methodology. As one of us has
written:
[W]hen I am supposedly standing shoulder to shoulder as an
“originalist” with, inter alia, Bruce Ackerman, Larry Alexander,
Sam Alito, Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett, Will Baude,
Raoul Berger, and Robert Bork—and those are just the “As” and
approach or this particular project. For more on the crucial, and too often overlooked,
distinction between originalism as a tool for ascertaining textual meaning and as a
prescriptive norm for governance see Authors’ Response, supra note 15, at 494–95; see
also Gary Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1313 (2013)
(discussing originalism as a theory of interpretation versus a theory of adjudication).
27. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006) [hereinafter Originalism as a Legal Enterprise]. As it
happens, reference to real-world thoughts and beliefs yields the same uncertainties
that we wrestle with using our hypothetical-author methods. The founding generation
was no more settled on what constitutes “the United States” than were the imperial
and anti-imperial theorists a century after the founding. See Gregory Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism and the Northwest Ordinance, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1631,
1652 (2019) (describing “multiple meanings of ‘United States’ in the late eighteenth
century”—“[s]ometimes, the term referred specifically and only to the thirteen states
collectively; in other instances, it described the entire territory of the nation of the
United States”).
28. For an outline of it, see POWER OF ATTORNEY, supra note 15, at 8–11; Gary
Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (Or: Could Fleming Be Right This
Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1461–63 (2016).
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“Bs” that leap immediately to mind who are swept in by some currently circulating broad definitions of originalism——it is not clear
that the label “originalist” is doing a lot of useful epistemological
work.29

Perhaps we should just say that we are engaged in the empirical project of ascertaining the communicative meaning of the phrase “We the
People of the United States” in the Constitution of 1788 and leave it
at that.
I. POWER

TO THE

PEOPLE30

For whose benefit are federal actors—Congress, the President, and
the federal courts31—supposed to govern? The Constitution answers
that question, albeit in ambiguous fashion, in its very first sentence.
The Constitution’s Preamble reads in full:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, ensur[e] domestic Tranquility, provide for
the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.32

The Preamble does not play much of a role in modern constitutional
discourse or law.33 Nor did it play much of a role in the founding era;
James Wilson “is the only one of the Founders to treat the Preamble
as a statement of the principles underlying the Constitution.”34 We do
not here enter into debates concerning whether or how the Preamble
does or should affect the scope of other constitutional provisions.35
Our focus on the Preamble has a more specific purpose: It tells us the
29. Id. at 1458.
30. With acknowledgments to John Lennon.
31. Technically, members of the electoral college are also federal actors. One
could say the same of state officials performing functions created by the federal Constitution, such as setting state rules for federal elections, and grand and petit jurors in
federal proceedings. One might even say it of voters in federal elections. But we focus
in this Article on Congress since it is the primary actor with regard to governance of
federal territory.
32. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
33. See John W. Welch & James A. Heilpern, Recovering Our Forgotten Preamble,
91 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2018) (“The Preamble is rarely mentioned in federal
court opinions, in constitutional law treatises, or in leading law school constitutional
textbooks.”). For a notable exception to the extended discussion of the Preamble
from casebooks, see STEVEN GOW CALABRESI & GARY LAWSON, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: CREATION, RECONSTRUCTION, THE PROGRESSIVES, AND THE MODERN ERA
115–42 (2020).
34. William Ewald, James Wilson and the American Founding, 17 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 21 (2019). But see Welch & Heilpern, supra note 33, at 1050 (taking a
more optimistic view of the Preamble’s significance at the founding).
35. See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION:
FOR MORAL READINGS AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS 62 (2015) (“[W]e should aspire
to fidelity to our scheme as an ongoing frame of government pursuing the ends of the
Preamble . . . .”).
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legal author of the Constitution, which in turn tells us who the Constitution was designed to benefit. The legal author of the Constitution is
“We the People of the United States,” and the document is designed
to benefit that author and its “Posterity.”
Of course, the Constitution was not in fact written by anything or
anyone that can plausibly be characterized as “We the People of the
United States.” If taken literally, the Preamble’s assertion of authorship is factually false, an absurd pretension, or both. For interpretative
purposes, however, two points must be kept in mind.
First, as far as meaning rather than legitimacy is concerned, it does
not matter how false or absurd a pretension the document’s announcement of authorship might be. To the extent that authorship is
relevant to the ascertainment of meaning, the document’s claim of authorship is conclusive.36
Second, legal documents often have literal authors and legal authors, and the two can be very different. Wills are almost never literally written by the decedents whose affairs they settle; they are written
by lawyers. But legally speaking, the will is considered to be the instrument of the decedent. If one is looking for the “intention” behind
the instrument, it is the intention of the decedent, not of the lawyer
who actually wrote the words, that matters. This is true even if the
decedent never read the will but just signed on the dotted line where
the lawyer pointed. Similarly, if one downloads a form document, such
as a lease, and then signs it, the unknown person or persons who literally wrote the form document are legally irrelevant; the document is
legally considered to be the product of the person who adopts and
uses it regardless of whether that person actually composed (or even
read) the words.37
The literal authors of the Constitution, including the Preamble,
were some combination of persons at the Constitutional Convention.
Probably the best candidates for literal authors of most of the words
of the document are the five members of the Committee of Detail,
consisting of Oliver Ellsworth, Nathaniel Gorham, Edmund Randolph, John Rutledge, and James Wilson.38 The Preamble in its final
36. Similarly, the 1975 science-fiction novel Venus on the Half-Shell must be interpreted by reference to the imagined intentions of the wholly fictional Kilgore Trout (a
character invented by Kurt Vonnegut) rather than by Philip José Farmer, the book’s
literal author. KILGORE TROUT, VENUS ON THE HALF-SHELL (1974). If Farmer
wanted his real intentions rather than Trout’s fictional ones to control, he could have
identified himself rather than Trout as the author.
37. Cf. RAYMOND W. GIBBS, JR., INTENTIONS IN THE EXPERIENCE OF MEANING
220 (1999) (“I might even purchase a birthday card from a local store, present this to a
friend, and claim authorship of the sentiments expressed in the card simply because I
signed and sent the card to a particular person, even if as ‘author’ I am not historically
connected to the person who wrote the text.”).
38. On the crucial role of the Committee of Detail in the drafting of the Constitution, see William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 202
(2012).
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form is perhaps best attributed to the Committee of Style, consisting
of Alexander Hamilton, William Johnson, Rufus King, James
Madison, and Gouverneur Morris.39 Perhaps one could more specifically link individual provisions, or even phrases, with particular persons, such as attributing the Territory or Other Property Clause or the
Preamble to Gouverneur Morris.40 But just as with a will or a form
lease, the legal author of the Constitution is none of those people who
actually composed the words. The legal author is identified in the Preamble as “We the People of the United States” who ordained and
established the document. That is the author in whose name the document was issued. As we noted above, for interpretative purposes, it
makes no difference whether that claim of authorship is a preposterous pretension, a profound insight about political theory, or neither.
For interpretative purposes—for purposes of understanding to what
things and relations in the world the words of the Constitution refer—
the claim is a brute fact. The document says that its author is “We the
People of the United States.” If you want to ascertain the communicative meaning of the document, you must take that claimed authorship
as a starting point without regard to its merit as a matter of political or
moral theory. Otherwise, you are inventing meaning rather than ascertaining it.
Importantly, “We the People of the United States” is not necessarily just the historically real and concrete people in the ratifying States
who gave the Constitution full legal effect in those States. Article VII
provides: “The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the
States so ratifying the Same.”41 The legal effect of the Constitution
thus depended on the actions of a specific group of historically real
people who participated in state ratifying conventions. That group
necessarily excluded inhabitants of federal territories who were not
citizens of some specific State that was part of the Constitution’s ratification process, because the territories, as territories, played no role in
constitutional ratification. Does that end this Article’s inquiry into the
constitutional status of territorial inhabitants before it even begins?
Not at all. Take a step back from the Article VII ratification scheme
and ask this more basic question: What gave Article VII any relevance?
The answer is that Article VII is only legally relevant, as far as the
Constitution is concerned, because the ordained and established Constitution authored by “We the People of the United States” made it
39. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 553 (Max Farrand
ed. 1911).
40. On Morris as the likely literal author of the Territory or Other Property
Clause, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 3, at 73. On Morris as the likely literal
author of the Preamble, see PETER CHARLES HOFFER, FOR OURSELVES AND OUR
POSTERITY: THE PREAMBLE TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN HISTORY
14 (2013).
41. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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so. Here again it is important to distinguish the task of interpreting the
Constitution from the task of justifying it or any form of government
emerging in its name. As a matter of political theory, we express no
view on whether the action of state ratifying conventions in 1787–1788
could, either with or without a draft of a constitution in front of them,
legitimately create a government. That is a question separate and
apart from ascertaining the legal authorship, and therefore the meaning, of the Constitution of 1788, and our only concern is with meaning.
For interpretative purposes, the ratifiers are relevant only because the
instrument that they are ratifying makes them relevant by its terms.
Those terms, in turn, were authored by “We the People of the United
States.” Ratifying conventions within certain States gave the Constitution formal legal effect, but the Constitution was “ordained and established” as a legal instrument by “We the People.” The exclusion of
territorial inhabitants from Article VII does not tell us the content of
“We the People of the United States.”
Moreover, note that the Preamble speaks in the present tense: We
the People “do ordain and establish this Constitution.” The act of ordaining and establishing is complete by the end of the Preamble’s one
sentence. Nothing more than the Preamble itself is necessary for that
act of ordaining and establishing. Article VII prescribes a separate act:
the “Establishment” of the Constitution among the ratifying States.
The ratifiers gave full legal effect within their own States to the Constitution, but the document itself existed prior to the ratification and
had communicative meaning prior to the ratification. “In 1788, the
Constitution had the same meaning in Rhode Island and North Carolina as it had in New Hampshire and Connecticut, and it would have
had the same meaning had it been defeated at five ratifying conventions.”42 Indeed, the ratifiers were ratifying “this Constitution,” which
had identity and meaning apart from the ratification process. Similarly, a will does not become fully effective until it goes through probate, but the probate judge is not the legal author of the instrument,
and one does not consult the judge’s intentions when ascertaining the
will’s meaning. Indeed, the judge strives to give effect to the intentions
of the decedent—the will’s legal author. For the same reasons, for
purposes of ascertaining communicative meaning, the author of the
Constitution is “We the People of the United States.” The document
says so.43
Another feature of “We the People of the United States,” which has
special relevance for the role of territorial inhabitants, is that the document in question was a constitution “for the United States of
America.” The Constitution did not bring the United States of
42. Gary Lawson, Classical Liberal Constitution or Classical Liberal Construction?, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 808, 821 n.50 (2014).
43. For a more detailed account of why and how “We the People” is the Constitution’s author, see Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, supra note 27, at 58–70.
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America into existence. The United States of America existed before
the Constitution was ratified, and the “People of the United States,”
as an entity capable of having legally constructed intentions, similarly
pre-dated the Constitution. The identity of “the People of the United
States” thus depends on pre-constitutional understandings.
The pre-constitutional existence of the United States is textually
clear from the Constitution itself. Article IV gives Congress “Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulation respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,”44 and
then adds that “nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to
Prejudice any Claims of the United States.”45 This means that the
Constitution assumes that “the United States” as an entity had claims
to territory or other property that pre-date the Constitution. Similarly,
the Article VI Engagements Clause provides that “[a]ll Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this
Constitution, as under the Confederation.”46 The “United States” that
existed under the Articles of Confederation is thus the same entity—
the same “United States”— for whom the Constitution provides new
powers and responsibilities. The Supremacy Clause similarly emphasizes continuity between the pre-ratification and post-ratification
“United States” by referencing “all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States.”47
These cross-temporal references are not surprising, as the Constitution did not immediately and fully displace the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution took effect in stages, with some provisions,
such as the Contracts Clause,48 taking effect immediately upon ratification on June 21, 1788. Other provisions, such as the Treaty Clause,49
could not become effective until the machinery of the federal government, such as a President and Senate, was in place, which did not fully
happen until spring 1789.50 The Constitution, unlike many of the state
constitutions of the time, did not contain an express provision regarding the transition from the previous regime to the new one.51 The best
inference from this silence is that certain institutions from the Articles
of Confederation, such as the treaty-making authority of the national
44. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
45. Id.
46. Id. art. VI, cl. 1.
47. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
48. See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
49. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (the President “shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties”).
50. On the stages of constitutional effectiveness, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (2001).
51. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The First “Establishment” Clause: Article
VII and the Post-Constitutional Confederation, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 83, 85–86
(2002).
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government, remained in force until the constitutional machinery to
replace those institutions was formed.52 Thus, “[t]he United States of
America” proclaimed in the Articles of Confederation53 was in existence before the Constitution was ratified, and it maintained its identity through ratification.
It is unclear at what moment in time “the United States” as an entity—and thus something called “the People of the United States”—
came into existence. At the very latest, the United States as a corporate entity54—and therefore “the People of the United States” as a
meaningful concept— existed as of March 1, 1781, when the Articles
of Confederation were ratified.55 The Articles on multiple occasions
refer to the United States as an entity distinct from the constituent
States.56 It is also possible that “the United States,” and therefore its
“People,” existed before that time, though the evidence is equivocal.
Counting against a pre-Articles of Confederation existence of the
United States and its “People” is the fact that if “the United States”
was a distinct entity before March 1, 1781, it would be fully capable of
holding property, which is one of the inherent powers of corporations
under founding-era corporate law.57 It would therefore have made
sense for land cessions from individual States to be made to that entity. New York ceded its western land claims more than a year before
ratification of the Articles of Confederation,58 but the cession very
pointedly was not made to “the United States” as an entity. Rather,
the cession was made “for the use and benefit of such of the United
States, as shall become members of the federal alliance of the said
states.”59 New York’s cession was a grant to States as parties to a confederation rather than to a distinctive entity called “the United
States.” The Virginia cession of January 2, 1781, similarly read as a
grant to “United States,” understood as a group of States rather than
a distinct corporate entity.60
52. We make this argument at some length in id. at 84.
53. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. I.
54. In the founding era, all governmental bodies were considered corporations.
See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 447 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“The
word ‘corporations,’ in its largest sense, has a more extensive meaning than people
generally are aware of. Any body politic (sole or aggregate) whether its power be
restricted or transcendant, is in this sense ‘a corporation.’ ”).
55. Primary Documents in American History, LIB. CONG. (Oct. 31, 2021, 8:04 PM),
www.loc.gov/rr/program//bib/ourdocs/articles.html [https://perma.cc/EK2A-DUEF].
56. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, arts. I, VI, IX.
57. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *463; see also John Mikhail,
The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063, 1082–83 (2015).
58. See Merrill Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 MISS. VALLEY HIST.
REV. 27, 43 (1936) (noting that New York ceded its lands on February 19, 1780).
59. 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 211 (1781).
60. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Huntington, ARCHIVES.GOV (Jan.
17, 1781), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-04-02-0481 [https://
perma.cc/HJV5-ALM8].
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The senses of foreign actors, and of diplomats negotiating with foreign actors over treaty language, does not necessarily say much about
the issues that concern us, but for whatever it is worth: The 1778
Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France was styled as an agreement among “[the] Most Christian King, and the thirteen United
States of North America, to wit: New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South Carolina and
Georgia.”61 That is an agreement among 14 distinct nation-states
rather than an agreement between France and a unitary corporate entity. Similarly, the contemporaneous Treaty of Alliance with France
was formed between France and individual States acting jointly rather
than between France and a distinct entity called “the United States.”62
This at least suggests that there was no “United States” before 1781.
On the other hand, even after 1781, treaties did not typically refer
to “the United States” as a distinct entity. The same formulation from
the 1778 treaties with France was used in 1782 for the Treaty of Amity
and Commerce with the Dutch Republic63 and the 1783 Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Sweden.64 The 1785 treaty with Prussia did
not specifically list each of the States as parties, but it did refer to “the
United States of America, and their citizens,”65 not to “the United
States of America, and its citizens.” None of these treaty provisions
reads as though the United States was a distinct entity, even after
1781, though it obviously was such an entity by that point. Perhaps
more tellingly, from an early date it was standard practice in those
pre-Articles treaties to refer to “two parties”66 to the treaties, which
understands the collective States to be a single entity. Other formulations referred to “either party”67 or, as in the post-Articles of Confederation Moroccan-American Treaty of Peace and Friendship, “both
parties.”68 If the relevant entities were the 13 States acting as discrete
nations, that reference would be inappropriate. But we do not want to
make too much of these formulations; it is obviously convenient for
treaties to refer to the assemblage of the collective States as a single
entity without intending to make any profound statements about the
independent corporate status of something called “the United States.”
61. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Fr.-U.S., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 12.
62. See Treaty of Alliance, Fr.-U.S., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 6.
63. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Neth.-U.S., Oct. 8, 1782, 8 Stat. 32.
64. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Swed.-U.S., Apr. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 60.
65. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Prussia-U.S., art. I, July-Sept. 1785, 8 Stat. 84
(emphasis added).
66. Treaty of Alliance, supra note 62, at 10, art. XI; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, supra note 61, at 22, art. XV.
67. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, supra note 61, at 20, 22, arts. XIV, XVII,
XIX, XX, XXIII.
68. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Morocco-U.S., Jan. 1787, art. I, 8 Stat. 100.
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More relevantly, in Respublica v. Sweers,69 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1779 clearly understood “the United States” to be a
distinct entity at least two years before the Articles of Confederation
took effect. Cornelius Sweers, a commissary clerk in the United States
Army during the Revolutionary War, was indicted, prosecuted, and
convicted in Pennsylvania “for altering a bill of parcels and receipt
given by Margaret Duncan, for goods bought from her, with intent to
defraud the United States”70 and “for forging a receipt, purporting to
be a receipt from one Adam Foulke, with intent to defraud the United
States.”71 Sweers’s defense was that there could be no such offense of
defrauding “the United States” because “‘at the time of the offence
charged, the United States were not a body corporate known in
law.’”72 There was, claimed Sweers, simply no “United States” for him
to defraud. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court tersely held otherwise:
From the moment of their association, the United States necessarily
became a body corporate; for, there was no superior from whom
that character could otherwise be derived. In England, the king,
lords, and commons, are certainly a body corporate; and yet there
never was any charter or statute, by which they were expressly so
created.73

It is not entirely clear what the court had in mind as “the moment of
their association.” Was that November 15, 1777, when the Articles of
Confederation were sent to the States for ratification? July 1776 when
the States jointly declared independence? Or was it even earlier, with
the meeting of the first Continental Congress in 1774, or even with the
meeting of the Stamp Act Congress of 1765? The court did not say,
and for our purposes it does not matter very much which precise date
the court had in mind. The United States certainly existed as an entity
once the Articles of Confederation took effect, which is why post-Articles treaties could refer to “the two nations”74 or, as in the Treaty of
Paris, “the two countries.”75 By early 1781, “the People of the United
States” thus existed as a legal entity capable of authoring documents
and having legally constructed intentions, just as any juridical entity,
such as a private corporation, is capable of issuing documents in its
own name and having legally constructed intentions.

69. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 41 (Pa. 1779).
70. Id. at 41 (emphasis omitted).
71. Id. at 43 (emphasis omitted).
72. Id. at 44.
73. Id.
74. Convention Between the Lords the States General of the United Netherlands,
and the United States of America, Concerning Vessells Re-captured, Oct. 8, 1782, art.
I, 8 Stat. 50.
75. Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 5, at 80.
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OTHER HAND76

If before 1788 there was a “United States,” and thus a “People of
the United States,” there were also “Citizen[s]” of the United States
during that time. Are those categories of “People” and “Citizen[s]”
co-extensive for purposes of understanding the Preamble?
It is possible, but we do not think so. To ascertain the meaning of
“We the People of the United States,” we do not think that we need to
solve the riddle of the meaning of a “Citizen of the United States” as
of 1788. That is good news, because it is quite a nasty riddle.
The Constitution of 1788 uses the term “Citizen of the United
States” solely in the context of qualifications for the presidency or
Congress. The Senate Qualifications Clause requires that senators be
United States citizens for at least nine years.77 Thus, in 1789 when a
Senate first convened, there seemingly had to be something called
“the United States” for people to be citizens of at least since 1780, a
year before the Articles of Confederation, or else no one would be
qualified to serve in the first Senate. Alternatively, of course, the term
could mean a citizen of any one of the United States, with such citizenship defined at the state level, rather than (or perhaps in addition
to) referring to United States citizenship as a distinct concept. The
Article II Qualifications Clause avoids this temporal problem by saying that the President must be a citizen “at the time of the Adoption
of this Constitution.”78 The Constitution says nothing about any of
these questions—leading to Attorney General Bates’ previously
quoted 1862 lament about the uncertain character of United States
citizenship79 and a great deal of subsequent and inconclusive
scholarship.
The difficulties of sorting out the meaning and consequences of citizenship run deep. It is not surprising that the founders chose to leave
the matter unaddressed. Societies wrestled with the multiple meanings
and consequences of citizenship at least since classical times80—and
the founding generation was well versed in classical studies,81 and
there is the basic fact that “there are still many aspects of ancient citi76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

With acknowledgements to Paul Overstreet, Don Schlitz, and Randy Travis.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
See Attorney General Opinion, supra note 22, at 383.
See JOSINE BLOK, CITIZENSHIP IN CLASSICAL ATHENS (2017); see also PHILIP
BROOK MANVILLE, THE ORIGINS OF CITIZENSHIP IN ANCIENT ATHENS (1990) (exploring the interplay between citizenship and social behavior in ancient Athens); A.N.
SHERMAN-WHITE, THE ROMAN CITIZENSHIP (2d ed. 1973); J.G.A. Pocock, The Ideal
of Citizenship Since Classical Times, 99 QUEEN’S Q. 33 (1992).
81. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (2008); CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS:
GREECE, ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT (1994).
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zenship that lay in the shadows.”82 Part of the problem is linguistic.
The term “citizen” can mean many things. Some of those meanings
are technical and legal, while others are more colloquial or cultural.
As a professor of English has aptly said: “In the early United States,
citizenship was less a legal category than an emergent extralegal concept that accumulated its meaning flexibly in rhetorical experiments
that traversed several genres.”83 Part of the problem is substantive.
How one defines a citizen depends largely on the consequences of that
definition. What does one get—and what does one owe—by virtue of
being a citizen rather than an alien? And part of the problem is political and structural. In the United States, there are two distinct citizenships: state and national. Often they go together, but sometimes they
do not. The concept of dual citizenship is at least as old as Roman
times, but it introduces complications that a careful study of citizenship must address. All these concerns sharply pose risks of equivocation: Uses of the term “citizen” in one context may mean something
quite different in other contexts or even in different premises of a
single argument.
We hope to avoid all these problems with defining citizenship. The
brute fact is that the Preamble that we are seeking to interpret does
not ever use the word “Citizen.” It uses the word “People”—in sharp
distinction to the specific uses of the word “Citizen” in the various
qualification clauses. It is certainly possible to have a conception of
“the People” that includes only citizens, but that is hardly inevitable,
especially if “citizen” takes on a technical legal meaning rather than a
broad colloquial one. Thus, we confine our efforts to trying to define
“We the People of the United States” without presupposing that this
category is or is not equivalent to some conception of “Citizens of the
United States.”
There was clearly something called “the United States” before the
Constitution. And if there was a United States, there was a “People of
the United States.” The real question is thus not whether “We the
People of the United States” was a kind of juridical entity akin to a
corporation in 1788. Of course it was. The real question is: Who were
the equivalents of its shareholders? More specifically, what precisely
was the extent of this “United States” whose “People” were purporting to speak in the Preamble about ordaining and establishing a new
constitution?
As we have noted, one of the legal characteristics of a corporation is
the capacity to hold land in its own name. “By March, 1781, Congress
82. Lucia Cecchet, Greek and Roman Citizenship: State of Research and Open
Questions, in CITIZENS IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD: ASPECTS OF CITIZENSHIP
FROM THE ARCHAIC PERIOD TO AD 212, at 1 (Lucia Ceccet & Anna Busetto eds.,
2017).
83. CARRIE HYDE, CIVIC LONGING: THE SPECULATIVE ORIGINS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP 9 (2018).

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-3\TWL302.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 19

28-APR-22

PEOPLE IN FEDERAL TERRITORIES

13:24

673

was in possession of the New York, Connecticut, and Virginia cessions,”84 making the United States prior to the Constitution a substantial landowner. The terms of the cessions effectuated before the
Articles of Confederation, we have noted, did not purport to grant
land to the United States as an entity,85 but by 1781 it was clear that
the United States was a distinct entity holding territory.86 What was
the status of that federally owned and governed territory—and more
specifically, what was the status of the inhabitants of that federally
owned and governed territory between 1781 and 1788?
We get some clues—though characteristically equivocal ones for
this topic—from the manner of federal governance of territory under
the Articles of Confederation. To be sure, it was not at all clear where
the Confederation Congress even got the power to govern territory
and its inhabitants. Article XIX of John Dickinson’s early draft of proposed articles of confederation contained a grant to Congress of
power to govern federal territory,87 but no such provision appears in
the actual Articles of Confederation. This absence has not gone unnoticed over the years,88 but no serious objections to lack of power were
raised in the founding era.89 Consequently, from an early date following the state cessions of territory, the Congress under the Article of
Confederation exercised power to govern the Northwest Territory, as
the ceded land is typically called.90
The first such statute in 1784 gave broad powers to territorial inhabitants to govern themselves:
[T]he settlers on any territory so purchased, and offered for sale,
shall, either on their own petition or on the order of Congress, receive authority . . . to meet together, for the purpose of establishing
a temporary government, to adopt the constitution and laws of any
one of the original States; so that such laws nevertheless shall be
subject to alteration by their ordinary legislature; and to erect, subject to a like alteration, counties, townships, or other divisions, for
the election of members for their legislature. . . . [Once such State
acquires 20,000 free inhabitants, its settlers] shall receive . . . authority . . . to call a convention of representatives to establish a permanent constitution and government for themselves.91
84. Merrill Jensen, The Creation of the National Domain, 1781-1784, 26 MISS.
VALLEY HIST. REV. 323, 323 (1939).
85. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
87. See Josiah Bartlett’s and John Dickinson’s Draft Articles of Confederation, in
Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774–1789, at 243 (Paul H. Smith ed. 1979).
88. See Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 940 n.77 (1995).
89. See JAMES G. WILSON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC: A STRUCTURAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE BEGINNING OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 73 (2002).
90. See id.
91. 26 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 276 (1784).
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There were provisos involving the kinds of governments that could be
created in the territory, including a proviso forbidding taxes on federal
land,92 but on the whole, the thrust of this statute was to treat the
inhabitants of territories as a self-governing body. The federal presence was limited to a vague provision declaring “[t]hat measures not
inconsistent with the principles of the Confederation, and necessary
for the preservation of peace and good order among the settlers in any
of the said new states, until they shall assume a temporary government as aforesaid, may, from time to time, be taken by the United
States in Congress assembled.”93 The statute assumed that these selfgoverning “State[s],” as the statute called them, would in time be admitted to the Confederation “on an equal footing with the said original states.”94
For reasons detailed by Peter Onuf in his indispensable study of the
Northwest Ordinance,95 this Jeffersonian/Republican vision of territorial self-governance ran into the reality of the need for law, order, and
clear property titles to attract adequate numbers of high-quality settlers to the region. Accordingly, the Confederation Congress in 1787
replaced this thin scheme with an “[o]rdinance for the government of
the territory of the United States, North West of the river Ohio,”96
popularly known as the Northwest Ordinance. This statute provided
for more robust federal supervision of the territory, but it still left considerable room for internal self-governance. Unsurprisingly, it sends
mixed messages about the status of territorial inhabitants.
On the one hand, the residents of the territory were referred to as
“inhabitants”97 rather than citizens, either of the United States
(whatever that would have meant at the time) or of any State. Indeed,
the assumption was that at least some residents would have no state
citizenship; qualification for service in the territorial legislature required that one “shall have been a citizen of one of the United States
three years and be a resident in the district or . . . shall have resided in
the district three years.”98
On the other hand, the provisions for internal territorial governance
through local legislatures, though more limited than the provisions in
1784, say much about how the territories and their inhabitants were
viewed in the pre-constitutional period. Even though many influential
state and national figures viewed the territorial settlers as less civilized
than their state counterparts and of dubious character for self-govern92. See id. at 277.
93. Id. at 278.
94. Id. at 277–78.
95. See PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, at xv (1992).
96. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 334 (1787).
97. See id. at 337, 340–43.
98. Id. at 337. There was also a modest property qualification. See id. at 337–38.
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ance,99 the Northwest Ordinance continued to provide for local legislatures elected by local inhabitants and retained the promise of
statehood as soon as specific population levels were reached.100 The
Ordinance stated that “[t]here shall be formed, in the said territory,
not less than three nor more than five States”101 and guaranteed those
States admission to the Union when their population reached
60,000.102 Indeed, that commitment to turning territorial inhabitants
into state inhabitants was put in place even before the land cessions
took place:
Before there was a Northwest Territory, its political future had been
prescribed. In the Public Lands Resolution of 10 October 1780, the
Congress had resolved (1) that the lands ceded to the United States
“shall be settled and formed into distinct . . . States, which shall
become members of the Federal Union, and shall have the same
rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence as the other
States,” and (2) that they shall be “republican States.”103

Even though the path to statehood looked longer and more complicated in 1788 than it did in 1780 or 1784,104 territorial status was always, in the founding era, considered a way station on the path to
statehood. As Peter Onuf put it: “[S]tatehood was immanent in the
American concept of territory.”105 If territorial inhabitants were not
yet fully citizens of the United States (again putting aside what that
might have meant in the 1780s), they were national citizens in the
making. They were guaranteed basic rights of citizens, such as trial by
jury,106 just compensation for takings of property,107 and the sanctity
of private contracts,108 and they were expected to fulfill basic duties of
citizens, such as “to pay a part of the federal debts contracted or to be
contracted, and a proportional part of the expenses of Government.”109 With rights came duties for territorial inhabitants, just as
with citizenship within a State.
On the other, other hand (and the reader may have noticed that
there are almost always several hands regarding these matters), the
99. See Duffey, supra note 88, at 936; Robert S. Hill, Federalism, Republicanism,
and the Northwest Ordinance, 18 PUBLIUS 41, 45 (1988). Those doubts were not entirely unjustified. See ONUF, supra note 95, at xiii (“Speculators, squatters, and other
adventurers infested the new settlements, promoting their private interests, defying
state and national authority, and entertaining overtures from foreign powers . . . .”).
100. See Robert Knowles, The Balance of Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States’
Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REV. 343, 371 (2003).
101. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 96, at 343.
102. See id. at 342–43
103. Hill, supra note 99, at 43.
104. See ONUF, supra note 95, at 54–55, 59–60, 72.
105. Id.
106. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 96, at 340.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 341. There was a similar proviso in the 1784 ordinance. See 26 JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 91, at 277.
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Northwest Territory was not wholly self-governing. It had a federally
appointed governor, secretary, and judges.110 As Gregory Ablavsky
has pointed out, the governance of the Northwest Territory had many
features of a federal administrative agency.111 Inhabitants of the territory were not nearly on a par with inhabitants in the States.
Depending on whether one sees the glass as half-empty or half-full,
one could plausibly say either that territorial inhabitants were very
close to or very far from being full members of the political community of the United States known as “We the People.” But in the end,
here are the simplest of questions that we think bear most directly on
the narrow interpretative question before us: When the 1782 treaty
with the Netherlands said that there would be
a firm, inviolable and universal peace and sincere friendship . . .
between the subjects and inhabitants of the said parties, and between the countries, islands, cities and places, situated under the
jurisdiction of the said United Netherlands, and the said United
States of America, their subjects and inhabitants, of every degree,
without exception of persons or places,112

could that possibly have meant only persons within the jurisdiction of
some specific State? Of course not. If the United States went to war,
would the opponent regard the people in the territories as enemy
combatants? Of course. When the United States acted as a corporate
entity, it acted on behalf of all the people subject to its jurisdiction,
including those in the territories without state citizenship.
It was certainly possible in 1788 to use the term “the United States”
to refer solely to an assemblage of the 13 States. But the most basic,
default understanding of that term would include the territory that
was not under the jurisdiction of any specific State but belonged to the
United States as a corporate entity. That was true in 1820, and it was
true in 1788. Thus, the people of “the United States,” presumptively
understood in this fashion, would at least presumptively include people in federal territory.
Presumptions, of course, are generally rebuttable. Does anything in
or about the Constitution rebut this one?
III. BOTH SIDES, NOW113
We can now begin to address our central question: Were territorial
inhabitants among the “We the People of the United States” who legally authored the Constitution?
110. See 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 96, at 335–36.
111. See Ablavsky, supra note 26, at 1633.
112. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, supra note 63, at 32.
113. With acknowledgments to Joni Mitchell (and to Judy Collins for the definitive
cover).
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The strongest argument against including them as part of “We the
People of the United States” comes from the Constitution itself.
While the Articles of Confederation neglected to give Congress explicit power to govern territories, the Constitution contained two
clauses specifically addressed to that topic. The Territories Clause—
or, as we would call it, the Territory or Other Property Clause—provides: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”114 A similar clause gives Congress power “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever”115 over the District of Columbia.116 Several features of
the Territory or Other Property Clause suggest that territories are
constitutionally distinct from the United States.
First, and most obviously, the clause describes federal territory as
“belonging to the United States.” It seems clear that “belonging” in
this context describes an ownership relationship rather than an inclusive one. The clause is not saying that federal territories “belong[ ]” to
the United States in the Loughborough v. Blake sense of being part of
the political unit but instead is saying that they “belong[ ]” to the
United States as property belongs to its owner. They are therefore, in
a constitutional sense, something different and apart from “the United
States” that owns them. That meaning is confirmed by the fact that
territory is conjoined in the clause with “other Property.” As far as the
Constitution is concerned, federal territory is equivalent to staplers or
paper clips owned by the federal government; the clause does not distinguish Congress’s power over the former from its power over the
latter. This is not a formulation designed to communicate clearly that
territorial inhabitants are on a par with state inhabitants or are fully
included within the political compass of “the United States.”
Second, for those who care about such things (and we generally do
not), the principal drafter of the Territory or other Property Clause,
Gouverneur Morris, deliberately crafted the clause to put federal territory into a dependent status. As Morris forthrightly admitted in an
1803 letter:
I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana, it would be proper to govern them as provinces, and allow
them no voice in our councils. In wording the third section of the
fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add my belief, that, had it

114. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
115. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
116. We do not explore here how similar or dissimilar these two provisions might
be. For a discussion of possible differences between the Territory and Other Property
Clause and the District Clause, see James Durling, The District of Columbia and Article III, 107 GEO. L.J. 1205 (2019).
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been more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would have
been made.117

The textual equation of territory with paper clips was not an accidental drafting error.
Third, the Territory or Other Property Clause includes a seemingly
unlimited right on the part of Congress to “dispose of” federal territory. This is a natural and expected aspect of the provision, as a principal purpose of ceding land to the national government was to allow it
to sell (“dispose of”) that land in order to pay national debts incurred
during the Revolutionary War. But the breadth of the clause would
seem to allow Congress to transfer that land, whether or not it is occupied, wholesale to a foreign power with or without consideration.
Such a transfer would impose on inhabitants of that transferred territory allegiance to the formerly foreign power that would now own the
territory. If any such power exists to effect that kind of transfer of
allegiance for inhabitants of a State, it can only come from the treaty
power, and any such treaty would require the consent of two-thirds of
the Senate.118 Moreover, if our view of the federal treaty power—set
out at length in other work119—is correct, state territory could only be
transferred to a foreign power as part of a treaty of peace, not for
ordinary commercial purposes.120 None of that is true with regard to
disposal of non-state territory; the Constitution seems to permit a reverse-Louisiana Purchase—a Louisiana Sale—if Congress deems it
appropriate. The relative freedom afforded Congress in the disposal
of territory—and the inhabitants thereof—suggests that federal territorial inhabitants are simply not part of “the People of the United
States” in the same sense as state inhabitants.
Finally, the Guarantee Clause requires every State to have “a Republican Form of Government.”121 There is no express constitutional
requirement that Congress establish republican institutions in
territories.122
117. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), in 3
THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE
AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS 192 (Jared Sparks ed., 1832).
118. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Of course, it would not require consent from
the House. Whether it is easier to get agreement from majorities of both houses of
Congress or from a two-thirds majority of the Senate is an empirical question that
changes from time to time and from issue to issue. Precisely that question drove much
of the debate over the annexation of Texas. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 3, at
92.
119. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1 (2006).
120. See id. at 62–64.
121. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
122. There is also no express definition in the Constitution of what constitutes a
“Republican Form of Government.” Extra-constitutional sources are not materially
more helpful. See CALABRESI & LAWSON, supra note 33, at 77–78.
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The Preamble itself also contains suggestions that territorial inhabitants are not part of “We the People.” One of the purposes of the
Constitution was “to form a more perfect Union.”123 As Akhil Amar
points out, this language was “openly patterned on the indissoluble
1707 union of Scotland and England, as Federalists emphasized at
every turn, in many states, in both speech and print, from the beginning to the end of the ratification process.”124 Scotland and England
were independent nations that chose to merge into a single political
unit. The States could have made that same choice in 1788, but an
owned territory that was not at the time an independent nation-state
could not—which explains why States but not the Northwest Territory
were part of the Article VII ratification process. It makes sense to
speak of a “Union” of formerly independent nation-states; it is hard to
see how this language applies to territory that is owned rather than
independent.
These are powerful arguments. Now we consider the other side.
The countervailing case in favor of including territorial inhabitants
in “We the People of the United States” also begins with the constitutional text—in this case the text of the Preamble. The Constitution
does not say that it was ordained and established by “We the Citizens
of the United States.” It does not describe its author as “We the Citizens of the various States.” It does not say “We the Ratifiers of the
Constitution.” It does not even use the phrase “We the People of the
States,” which is precisely the language that was used in the first draft
of the provision. The preamble that emerged from the Committee of
Detail, and that at one point received the approval of the Constitutional Convention, read: “We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations,
Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and establish the following Constitution for the
Government of Ourselves and our Posterity.”125 This version clearly
excludes territorial inhabitants from the “People” authoring the Constitution; only people in the States counted. The final version of the
Preamble produced by the Committee of Style uses the broader
term—indeed, perhaps the broadest term that one could use—“We
the People of the United States.” If the presumptive meaning of “the
United States” includes territories, the presumptive meaning of this
provision would also include territorial inhabitants. If the document
meant to refer to a narrower, specific sub-group of people, it would
have been very easy to do so.
123. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
124. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE WORDS THAT MADE US: AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATION, 1760–1840 263 (2021).
125. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 39, at 177.
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There is really no way to tell whether this substitution of language
by the Committee of Style was deliberately attempting to broaden the
specification of the Constitution’s authorship. Even if we cared what
the drafters of this language subjectively thought (and we mostly do
not), we have little information about how the precise wording of the
Preamble came about. No one on the Committee of Style took notes.
Accordingly, “historians have very little evidence of what went on in
the meetings of the Committee of Style.”126 Nor was there relevant
discussion of the meaning of “We the People of the United States” at
the Constitutional Convention or during ratification. All we have is
the text, and the text seems to sweep quite broadly.
The next argument for including territorial inhabitants in “We the
People” is a bit subtler but perhaps even more powerful. The author
“We the People of the United States” purports to be ordaining and
establishing a constitution. Again, it does not matter for interpretative
purposes whether this makes even the slightest bit of sense as a matter
of normative political theory. It is what the document says it is about,
so for purposes of understanding the document, one must take that as
a given. The natural inference is that this author “We the People of
the United States” thinks itself subject to the jurisdiction of the entity
that it is creating. More to the point, “We the People of the United
States” is the entity empowering the institutions of government mentioned in the instrument, with the goal of having those institutions
manage some portion of the affairs of “We the People of the United
States.” The scope of power exercised by those institutions extends
over the entire geographic and political range of the United States in its
broadest sense, including federally owned territory. Congress is given
power to make rules and regulations respecting territory.127 The President’s “executive Power”128 includes the power to execute federal law
within territories. The power of federal courts to decide cases “arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority”129 includes
cases involving territories. “We the People of the United States” could
not possibly think that it was empowering institutions to govern, let us
say, French or Spanish inhabitants, because there would be a spectacular mismatch between the empowering and empowered entities. To
match up the powers with the empowering requires including territorial inhabitants among the empowering.
This understanding of “We the People of the United States” connects the wording of the Preamble to the wording of the Declaration
of Independence a decade earlier. One of the most famous self-evident truths announced by the Declaration is that to secure rights,
126.
127.
128.
129.

HOFFER, supra note 38, at 66.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed.”130 Since territorial inhabitants are
among the people governed by the Constitution, their consent is essential to the structure. Since consent in this context is figurative
rather than literal, a reasonable accommodation of the need for the
consent of the governed with the realities of formation of a government is to include territorial inhabitants among the beneficiaries of
the instrument by reading the term “People” to encompass them.
To be sure, one must not make more of this argument than it will
bear. A strong form of this argument makes assumptions about the
eighteenth-century perception of representation and its relationship to
political authority that are the stuff of felled forests. We are not historians, political scientists, or political or moral theorists, and we have
no desire to inject ourselves into those debates. We simply offer, as a
matter of legal interpretation, the observation that the Constitution
makes the most sense as a fiduciary instrument if the empowering
principal is a good fit with the powers granted to the various agents.
Since those powers include authority over territorial affairs, the Constitution makes more sense as a fiduciary instrument if one has a
broader rather than narrower conception of “We the People of the
United States” that includes all the people subject to the jurisdiction
of the government even if they are not subject to a specific State’s
jurisdiction.
If all we had to go on were the arguments just canvassed, the weight
of argument would probably lean, however slightly, against including
territorial inhabitants among “We the People.” The textual arguments
against inclusion are straightforward, and the counterarguments are
more equivocal. It seems unlikely that the Committee of Style was
making fundamental changes to the draft of the Preamble that expressly excluded territorial inhabitants, and the argument from a
structural matching of the Constitution’s author with the Constitution’s governed has a question-begging quality to it. The arguments
for including territorial inhabitants, to be sure, are not meritless. Far
from it—they are very substantial. But if the interpretative enterprise
consists solely of weighing the strengths of the combined arguments
on each side, the case against inclusion seems somewhat stronger than
the case for it.
The interpretative question, however, is a bit subtler than this simple comparison of arguments suggests. It might make a big difference
how much the weight of argument leans in one or the other direction.
We began this Section with a presumption in favor of treating “the
United States” as including territories, which readily leads to a presumption in favor of treating “People of the United States” as including people in the territories. We think that presumption is warranted
130. THE DECLARATION

OF

INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-3\TWL302.txt

682

unknown

Seq: 28

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

28-APR-22

13:24

[Vol. 9

given the circumstances leading up to 1788 and the likely default understanding of a term such as “the United States.” How strong is that
presumption, and are the arguments presented in this section strong
enough to overcome it?
Our definitive answer is that we do not know—and we doubt
whether anyone else does either. There is no objective metric for measuring the strength of a presumption or the weight of evidence used to
rebut it. Perhaps all that a presumption does in this context is provide
a default result in the absence of any evidence in either direction. If
the prima facie case for inclusion of territorial inhabitants in “We the
People of the United States” takes this Thayerian form131 of “[a] presumption that allows the party against whom the presumption operates to come forward with evidence to rebut the presumption, but that
does not shift the burden of proof to that party,”132 the textual and
structural case against inclusion surely counts as non-zero evidence
sufficient to remove that presumption from play. On the other hand,
there is another kind of Thayerian presumption that leads to very different results. If we are talking about a presumption akin to Thayer’s
rule of clear mistake for constitutional review of federal action, in
which courts “disregard the [federal] Act [only] when those who have
the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have
made a very clear one—so clear that it is not open to rational question,”133 the case against inclusion of territorial inhabitants would
need to establish its claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Whatever that
familiar but elusive term “beyond a reasonable doubt” might mean,
the case for excluding territorial inhabitants from “We the People of
the United States” does not remotely approach it. If that is the relevant presumption, it has not been, and probably cannot be, overcome.
In between these two Thayerian poles, of course, is an infinite variety
of gradations of the strength of a presumption. Where one locates the
relevant presumption and how one ascertains the strength of the evidence against it are matters that do not lend themselves to clear
answers.
A full exploration of these matters would take us down several
rabbit holes involving epistemology, cognitive theory, and evidence
law and theory, among other rabbit holes, and that is far afield from
131. This account of presumptions as a decision tool in the absence of evidence
received its classic expression in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 355–58 (1898), and has been largely codified in the Federal Rules
of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 301 (“In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these
rules provide otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed has the
burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule does not shift
the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it originally.”). State
law practice is much more varied.
132. Thayer Presumption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
133. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
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this project.134 The best we can do at this point is to say that there are
good-faith arguments to be made on both sides for including or excluding territorial inhabitants from among “We the People of the
United States.” Reasonable people of good will could take and defend
either position as a matter of interpretative theory.
As a matter of ascertaining communicative meaning, we do not
think that the answer depends much on the consequences of choosing
one or the other interpretation. But the consequences of viewing territorial inhabitants among “We the People of the United States” are
worth noting. Accordingly, we conclude with two questions: (1) If, hypothetically, territorial inhabitants are among the “People of the
United States,” what does that mean for agents of federal governance?; (2) If, hypothetically, “the People of the United States” in 1788
included territorial inhabitants, would that include people in after-acquired territories such as Puerto Rico or American Samoa?
IV. (EVERYTHING I DO) I DO IT

FOR

YOU135

Building on the pioneering work of Robert G. Natelson, we have
argued at great length elsewhere that the Constitution is a kind of
fiduciary instrument, in which a principal—“We the People of the
United States”—grants to various agents—Congress, the President,
and the federal courts, among others—some measure of authority
over and responsibility for We the People’s affairs.136 We will not repeat here the book-length case for this characterization of the Constitution. Suffice it to say that preambles that explain the purposes of
power-granting instruments were not uncommon in fiduciary instruments of the founding era. Those preambles give guidance on how the
agents are supposed to perform their discretionary functions. Those
functions are cabined always by, first and foremost, the express terms
of the fiduciary instrument and, secondly and crucially, the background norms of fiduciary law137 that constitute the default rules that
134. For those who find the rabbit holes tempting, see GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE
LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS (2017).
135. With acknowledgments to Bryan Adams, Michael Kamen, and Mutt Lange.
136. See POWER OF ATTORNEY, supra note 15; Authors’ response, supra note 15.
For the seminal works by Rob Natelson (who we only half-jokingly call our
“unindicted co-author”), see Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 243 (2004); Robert G.
Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004); Robert G. Natelson, The Government as Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration from the
Reign of Trajan, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 191 (2001).
137. A recent article by Professors Sam Bray and Paul Miller questions whether
there was anything that can be called “fiduciary law” in the founding era. See Samuel
L. Bray and Paul B. Miller, Against Fiduciary Constitutionalism, 106 VA. L. REV.
1479, 1482 (2020). They are right in this respect: The general category of fiduciary law,
or fiduciary instruments, did not really exist until substantially after the founding. In
the founding era, there was a law of factors, a law of guardians, a law of powers of
appointment, a law of stewards, and so forth, but there was no overarching frameOF THE
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govern the actions of agents in the absence of express directives to the
contrary in the fiduciary instruments.
The specific preamble at issue here contains many goals or purposes
for the agents to pursue, including most notably “secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” The “ourselves” is a
direct reference to the author who ordained and established the Constitution: “We the People of the United States.” Faithful agents who
receive power under this instrument would understand that their tasks
include providing the blessings of liberty to “the People of the United
States” and its “Posterity.”
The trick is how to operationalize that fiduciary obligation in the
real world given the fictitious character of “We the People” (not to
mention its “Posterity”). That is a task for another life, but fortunately
two simple points suffice to settle the broad question of federal obligations towards territories and their inhabitants.
First, all provisions in the Constitution, including the provisions giving Congress power over federal territory and the District of Columbia, giving the President “executive Power” in those territories, and
giving federal courts the power and duty to decide cases involving
those territories that arise under federal law, come packaged with fiduciary duties. Those duties do not need to be expressly set out in the
instrument, just as they would not need to be set out expressly in any
instrument engaging a steward, a factor, a guardian, or any other fiduciary agent. To be sure, the instrument would need to identify and
define those fiduciary duties if it wanted to deviate from the commonlaw baseline of duties that functions as the default rules for any fiduciary instrument, but silence brings the default rules into play. Those
default rules, as they stood in the late eighteenth century, were aptly
summarized by the indispensable Rob Natelson:
A. The Duty to Follow Instructions and Remain Within
Authority
Fiduciaries were required to honor the rules creating their power
and, therefore, had an absolute obligation to remain within their
authority. If a fiduciary did not act within his power, it was irrelevant whether or not he acted reasonably.
work that eigteenth-century lawyers would have seen as uniting all of these topics.
But Professors Bray and Miller are wrong, we think, in another important respect.
There was no vocabulary of general fiduciary law in the late eighteenth century, but
there was a substance of such law. The category of fiduciary law emerged later because there was law for the category to describe; the commonalities were there even if
they were not always expressly recognized. Robert Natelson has exhaustively catalogued the core features of eighteenth-century fiduciary law in this retrospective
sense. See Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
in GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY SEIDMAN,
THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 57–59 (2010) [hereinafter
Natelson, Necessary and Property Clause]; and Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of
Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the
Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 239–40 (2007).
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....
B. The Duties of Loyalty and Good Faith
Fiduciaries were to represent their beneficiaries honestly and with
undivided loyalty and not act in a way prejudicial to them. Self-dealing was a breach of trust.
C. The Duty of Care
Fiduciaries were not insurers of everything that might go wrong
under their administration, that is, for “meer [sic] accident” or for
cases in which the beneficiary was at fault. There was, nonetheless, a
basic duty of care or diligence . . . .
D. The Duty to Exercise Personal Discretion
When not authorized in the instrument creating the relationship,
fiduciary duties were nondelegable . . . .
E. The Duty to Account
Fiduciaries, then and now, were expected to account to those for
whom they worked . . . .
F. The Duty of Impartiality
In absence of a specific rule to the contrary (such as the rule permitting a creditor-executor to pay himself before he paid other
creditors), the common law courts favored impartiality among
members of the same class. The bias of the High Court of Chancery
– the source of most fiduciary law – toward impartiality was even
stronger.138

There is nothing in the Constitution that fundamentally alters these
basic fiduciary duties for federal actors. Indeed, these duties are confirmed, clarified, and strengthened by many constitutional provisions,
including specific provisions detailing the duty to account,139 the duty
of loyalty,140 and the duty to stay within the limits of granted
authority.141
The duty that is perhaps most pertinent to territorial affairs is the
duty of impartiality. Where an agent represents multiple principals,
the baseline eighteenth-century common-law rule was that the agent
must consider the interests of all the principals. We have elsewhere
explored and developed that baseline rule at considerable length.142
It does not require all principals to be treated equally (which would be
impossible in many contexts), but it does require them to be treated
fairly. As a noted fiduciary expert aptly put it: “[W]here a fiduciary
serves classes of beneficiaries . . . as a whole, the fiduciary is nonethe138. Natelson, Necessary and Property Clause, supra note 137, at 57–59 (footnotes
omitted).
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“[A] regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”).
140. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
141. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; id. art. VI, cl. 3.
142. See POWER OF ATTORNEY, supra note 15, at 151–71. That chapter, as with
most of our work on fiduciary constitutionalism, could not have existed without Rob
Natelson. See Gary Lawson, Guy I. Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary
Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415, 415 (2014).
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less required to act fairly as between different classes of beneficiary in
taking decisions which affect the rights and interests of the classes inter se.”143 Pre-founding and founding-era caselaw amply reflects this
understanding.144 Those cases treated equality among principals as a
baseline norm,145 but allowed deviations from that norm when there
were good reasons to treat different members of the beneficiary class
differently—as, for example, when one beneficiary of an estate had
received substantial sums from the testator before death.146
In the context of territorial governance, this means that territorial
inhabitants must be treated fairly, though not necessarily identically,
with non-territorial inhabitants. It would require a separate article
(which we are contemplating) to try to sort through the various contexts in which this principle might arise and be resolved in practice. In
particular, one would need an account of what constitutes good reasons for different treatment of territorial and non-territorial inhabitants—just as one needs an account of what constitutes good reasons
for differential treatment of beneficiaries of an estate when the holder
of a power of appointment has discretionary, but not limitless, power
to dispose of assets. As with many questions of public constitutional
law, the answer may lie in a careful study of pre-constitutional private
law,147 which had much experience dealing with similar problems of
agency in a world of multiple principals with competing interests.
Second, the best understanding of “Posterity,” as that term is used
in the Preamble, extends into the future to include inhabitants of territories not yet acquired in 1788. Of course, the literal definition of
“posterity” would be “succeeding generations; descendants.”148 But a
literal definition in the context of the Preamble makes no sense and is
pragmatically unwarranted. The term “posterity,” and its connection
to constitutional preambles, did not spring full blown from the Committee of Style. The Constitution’s Preamble draws on a multiplicity
of similar provisions in earlier state constitutions and other documents
that also mention “posterity”:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent and
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state
of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of
143. Paul Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State, in EQUITY: ISSUES
TRENDS 131, 138 (Malcolm Cope ed., 1995) (emphasis added).
144. See POWER OF ATTORNEY, supra note 15, at 157–63.
145. See, e.g., Gibson v. Kinven (1682) 23 Eng. Rep. 315, 316 (Ch.).
146. See Burrell v. Burrell (1768) 27 Eng. Rep. 428, 428–29 (Ch.).
147. See Authors’ Response, supra note 15, at 515–20. For an example of how this
application of private-law fiduciary principles can apply to specific constitutional
problems, see Gary Lawson, A Private-Law Framework for Subdelegation, in THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE (Peter J. Wallison & John Yoo, eds., 2022).
148. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755).
AND
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acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.149
[I]t is our indispensable duty to establish such original principles
of government, as will best promote the general happiness of the
people of this State, and their posterity, and provide for future improvements, without partiality for, or prejudice against any particular class, sect, or denomination of men whatever . . . .150
We, therefore, the people of Massachusetts, acknowledging, with
grateful hearts, the goodness of the great Legislator of the universe,
in affording us, in the course of His providence, an opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, without fraud, violence or surprise, of entering into an original, explicit, and solemn compact with each
other; and of forming a new constitution of civil government, for
ourselves and posterity; and devoutly imploring His direction in so
interesting a design, do agree upon, ordain and establish the following Declaration of Rights, and Frame of Government, as the CONSTI151
TUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

These provisions obviously do not limit their scope to then-existing
inhabitants and their biological progeny. These States all expected and
welcomed new immigrants who were not literally the “posterity” of
the inhabitants at a specific instant in time. “Posterity” in these contexts thus refers to all people who will come within the jurisdiction of
the State in a condition legally equivalent to those who are already
present; “posterity” has a broad and metaphorical meaning rather
than a hereditarily literal one.
The Preamble’s reference to “Posterity” also obviously includes future persons biologically unrelated to existing inhabitants. The Constitution provides for “Naturalization,”152 and it was widely understood
in 1788 that the United States was going to expand. The Articles of
Confederation provided for automatic admission of Canada if it
wanted to join the Union.153 The Constitution allows Congress to admit new States,154 and there is no plausible case for limiting that ad149. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (West, Westlaw through End of the 2021 Reg. Sess.)
(emphasis added).
150. Pa. Const. of 1776 Preamble, AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/pa08.asp [https://perma.cc/VNY8-LHZT] (emphasis added); see also Vt.
Const. of 1786 Preamble, VT. ST. ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., https://
sos.vermont.gov/vsara/learn/constitution/1786-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/6VLG6P82] (employing identical language).
151. MA. CONST. OF 1780 pmbl. (West, Westlaw through amendments approved
Feb. 1, 2021) (first emphasis added).
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
153. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XI (“Canada, acceding to this
confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted
into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be
admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States.”).
154. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union”).
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mission power only to territory then held by the United States.155 Nor
was it universally understood that all expansion would occur on continental North America; Thomas Jefferson, at least, regarded “Cuba as
the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system
of States.”156 If one looks only at the Constitution of 1788, and not at
the politics and ideology of 1898, it is hard to see how future territories stand in any different position from territories that existed in
1788.
If territorial inhabitants in 1788 were among “We the People of the
United States,” territorial inhabitants in 2022—wherever on the globe
those territories are located—are pretty clearly among the “Posterity”
to whom the Preamble refers. Whatever fiduciary obligations federal
actors owed to territorial inhabitants in 1788 also apply in 2022.
155. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 3, at 73–78 (providing further analysis on
the Admissions Clause).
156. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 24, 1823), in 12 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 320 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).

